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Introduction 
 
Duncan Pritchard, in his ambitious and very thought-provoking book 
Epistemic Angst (Princeton University Press, 2016) develops a proposal 
that aims to provide a solution to radical scepticism, namely, the 
problem of external world scepticism. Pritchard’s response to radical 
scepticism is a bifurcated one - a two-pronged, integrated, 
undercutting treatment of both putative sceptical paradoxes. On the 
one hand, he develops an anti-sceptical theory that is inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of the rational evaluation as 
it mainly appears in his remarks that were posthumously published as 
On Certainty.1 On the other hand, Pritchard advances a particular 
account of epistemological disjunctivism inspired by John McDowell’s 
work. Despite the initial lack of connection that these two 
independent approaches appear to have, Pritchard managed to show 
that both approaches could be complementary to a full treatment of 
radical scepticism. He focuses on the logical structure of radical 
sceptical arguments and argues that the formulation of radical 
scepticism that turns on a closure-style principle is logically distinct 
from a very similar formulation that turns on what became known as 
the underdetermination principle. He argues that once one is able to 
see that these two formulations of the sceptical argument rise out of 
different sources then one can realize that distinct responses are 
needed to treat each formulation. 
Despite the fact that I’m, on the whole, quite sympathetic with 
the way Pritchard was able to deal with the issue of radical sceptical 
paradoxes, I do have some concerns about his response to the closure-
based sceptical argument. In the remainder of this paper, I will present 
those concerns. In particular, I’m not convinced that Pritchard’s 
reading of Wittgenstein’s approach to the structure of the rational 
evaluation based on the idea of hinge commitments taken as non-
																																																															
1 Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty, (eds.) G. E. M. Ascombe & G. H. von Wright, 
(tr.) D. Paul & G. E. M. Ascombe, Oxford: Blackwell. 
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beliefs is well succeeded. If that is right, then Pritchard’s response to 
the closure-based sceptical arguments is less compelling than one 
could initially think. 
In the first part of the paper I will present Pritchard’s approach 
to Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitments, which is essential to 
his solution to the closure-based sceptical arguments. And, in the 
second par of the paper, I will raise some concerns that I have regarding 
Pritchard’s non-belief reading of the hinge commitments. In the third 
and final part, I make some concluding remarks regarding Pritchard’s 
overall strategy to solve the closure-based sceptical paradox.  
 
1. Pritchard’s Approach to Hinge Commitments 
 
Pritchard suggests in his book that the antidote to the problem 
posed by closure-based radical sceptical paradox lies in a distinctive 
conception of the structure of rational evaluation as proposed by 
Wittgenstein on his book On Certainty (OC). Wittgenstein’s idea is that 
both sceptical (which claims our rational basis for our beliefs is quite 
vulnerable) and non-sceptical approaches (which claims we have a 
strong rational basis for our beliefs) have incorrect results because 
both rely on the assumption that there is a universal (global) structure 
of rational evaluation available. But for him, this assumption is 
mistaken. He argues that the structure of rational evaluation must be 
fundamentally local. Let’s see what is the use Pritchard does of the 
Wittgensteinian notion of hinge commitments and how it is applied to 
the closure-based sceptical paradox. 
In his attempt to deny the assumption of a universal structure 
of rational evaluation, Wittgenstein introduces the notion of hinge 
commitments. According to him, hinge commitments are not up to 
rational evaluation: they cannot be rationally supported nor rationally 
doubted. The existence of such commitments constitutes the very 
condition of possibility for further rational evaluation since they are 
thought as providing the framework relative to which the rational 
evaluation takes place – independent of the character of the 
evaluation (positive or negative). Diverging from Moore,2 which 
thought that these optimally certain propositions (‘Moorean 
propositions’) enjoyed a special status on the rational level, 
Wittgenstein insisted that the hinge commitments were to be 
considered as essentially groundless. The following passage seems to 
																																																															
2 In his ‘A Defence of Commonsense’ and ‘Proof of the External World’ G. E. Moore 
famously argued that we do have knowledge of the ‘commonsense view of the 
world’. For him, propositions such as ‘I have hands’ and ‘there is an external world’ 
can be known and can serve as direct responses against sceptical doubts. 
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support Wittgenstein’s idea:  
 
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should 
not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I 
don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test 
my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What 
is to be tested by what? (OC, §125)  
 
He was genuinely concerned that if we start doubting all 
propositions we would be dragged into unintelligibility. Doubting 
those things that are optimally certain to us can never be rational 
because “it will always call into question one’s entire system of 
beliefs” (Pritchard, 2016: 78), and consequently, it would be self-
defeating. In another passage, Wittgenstein says that “If you tried to 
doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The 
game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.” (OC, §115) His idea is 
that there must be something that needs to stand fast in order to 
rational doubt genuinely arises, and the hinge commitments are our 
bedrocks. But for him, these hinge commitments does not have any 
special epistemic status or any special rational grounding as we can see 
in the following passage: 
  
My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as 
anything that I could produce in evidence for it. […] That is why I 
am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for 
it. (OC, §250)  
 
In this sense, if hinge commitments have no special rational 
grounds, then it does not make sense to rationally doubt it, and for the 
same reason, it does not make sense to rationally require any rational 
basis for it. Hinge commitments are thus essentially a-rational. As 
Pritchard noted, Wittgenstein has emphasized that our hinge 
commitments are neither acquired via rational processes not directly 
responsive to natural considerations in the same way our normal 
beliefs are. Wittgenstein thought of hinge commitments as having a 
visceral, “animal” (OC, §359) nature. He also thought that hinge 
commitments are not acquired through rational processes. According 
to him, we are never explicitly taught about our hinge commitments, 
rather we ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §359) together with other things 
that we are explicitly taught. He assumes that in normal 
circumstances, if everything runs normally, the hinge commitments 
would “lie apart from the route travelled by inquiry.” (OC, §88). 
Consider the following remarks made by Wittgenstein: 
 
[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the 
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fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were 
like hinges on which those turn.  
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific 
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.  
 
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate 
everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with 
assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. 
(OC, §§341–3) 
 
As can be noticed in this passage, Wittgenstein is not saying 
that the fact hinge commitments are not up to rational evaluation is 
due to any kind of limitation on our part, they are not “grounded in my 
stupidity or credulity.” (OC, §235) Rather, as noted already, in order 
for a rational evaluation to take place we need something to stand 
fast, and the hinge commitments are the things that play that role. So, 
his point is that the idea of a fully general rational evaluation doesn’t 
make sense because it would make rational evaluation impossible 
once we started doubting everything. Hinge commitments are, in this 
sense, essential as they form the framework relative to which any 
rational evaluation occurs. 
Now, let’s ask the important question: How this hinge 
epistemology approach applies to the closure-based sceptical 
paradox? Pritchard thinks that Wittgenstein’s proposal has a direct 
application to the closure-based sceptical paradox in virtue of how it 
demonstrates how closure-based inferences are simply not applicable 
to our hinge commitments. According to him, the central aspect to 
solving this problem is to recognize that the closure principle is simply 
not applicable to hinge commitments, and hence that it cannot be 
properly used to motivate the sceptical challenge in play. The key to 
understand how hinge commitments are immune to sceptical doubts 
is the assumption that hinge commitments are not beliefs; at least not 
in the sense epistemologists typically understand beliefs. Given that 
our most basic certainties are not up to rational evaluation and thus 
cannot be rationally doubted (disconfirmed) or rationally supported 
(confirmed), they cannot be knowledge apt beliefs. Consequently, the 
sceptic is not warranted to employ the closure principle to appeal to 
its conclusion. 
 
2. Some Worries for Pritchard 
 
Now, let me present some of the concerns I have with 
Pritchard’s approach. My worry with Pritchard’s response to the 
closure-based sceptical paradox has to do with his reading of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitments. In particular, I don’t 
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think he is successful in defending an attempt to find a middle ground 
between Wittgenstein account of the structure of rational evaluation 
and a nonpropositional reading of hinge commitments, according to 
which entertaining a hinge proposition involves a different type of 
propositional attitude than that of believing. Consider the following 
passage about his non-belief reading of hinge commitments: 
 
Like the nonpropositional reading, it precludes the possibility 
that we can have knowledge, much less rationally grounded 
knowledge, when it comes to our hinge commitments. If we are 
not even in the market for belief in this regard then we are, a 
fortiori, not in the market for knowledge either, rationally 
grounded or otherwise, particularly once we bear in mind that the 
notion of belief in play is precisely that notion that is meant to be 
a component part of knowledge (i.e., knowledge-apt belief). But 
unlike the nonpropositional reading, this proposal doesn’t 
demand that we should think of our hinge commitments in 
inherently nonpropositional terms. For sure, such commitments 
can never coherently be thought of as beliefs, but that doesn’t 
prevent them from being expressed via other propositional 
attitudes. (Pritchard, 2015: 91) 
 
It is not controversial that propositional attitudes are attitudes 
towards propositions, which by their nature are responsive to rational 
considerations. But when Pritchard argues that his non-belief reading 
does not demand that we should think of our hinge commitments in 
inherently nonpropositional terms, he is in fact implying that hinge 
commitments do have propositional contents. And if this is right, then 
a hinge commitment could be the content of a propositional attitude; 
therefore it could be the object of belief after all. However, Pritchard 
contends that hinge commitments cannot be the contents of beliefs; 
they can only be contents of a particular type of propositional attitude. 
The fundamental problem is that he does not make clear what this 
particular kind of propositional attitude would be – what makes his 
point less palatable. 
In another passage Pritchard says: 
 
[…] It is rather to say that there are certain minimal, but 
constitutive nonetheless, connections between belief and truth 
such that a propositional attitude that didn’t satisfy them simply 
would not count as a belief, but would be a different 
propositional attitude entirely. (Pritchard, 2015: 90)  
 
Here Pritchard seems to be trying to motivate the idea that 
there can be a different propositional attitude for hinge commitments. 
But his particular strategy seems to be misguided. One’s belief that it 
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is raining outside can have no connection with the truth – as in the case 
where it is false – and still be regarded as a belief. Belief is the 
propositional attitude of taking something as true, whether or not the 
propositional content is, in fact, true or have any connection with the 
truth. And this seems to be an attitude one could still have towards a 
hinge commitment, despite the fact that it cannot be rationally 
evaluated. The problem is that by accepting this, one is committed 
with an unwelcome implication, namely, that we suffer from some 
kind of ‘blindness’ since we can (and usually do) seem to take hinge 
commitments to be true and form beliefs on them. In this sense, we 
would form beliefs about our hinge commitments because we are blind 
to the fact that hinge commitments are not available to rational 
scrutiny. What appears to be very problematic by taking this line of 
reasoning is that this picture doesn’t seem to be the case; most of the 
people don’t think they are making a mistake when they look to their 
hands when asked about how they know they have hands. In any case, 
it does not seem that Pritchard is clear enough about this point. 
Take for instance another passage: 
 
In particular, it makes no sense, for example, for there to be an 
agent who believes that p while taking herself to have no reason 
whatsoever for thinking p to be true. A fortiori, it does not make 
sense for an agent to believe that p while taking herself to have 
overwhelming reasons for thinking that p is false. In such cases, 
the propositional attitude in question would not be a belief but a 
different propositional attitude entirely, such as a wishful 
thinking. (Pritchard, 2015: 91) 
 
It is not clear how these examples should be helping Pritchard 
to motivate the idea of a different propositional attitude to 
encompass hinge commitments. Consider, for instance, the well-
known Norman clairvoyant case. Norman has formed a belief due to 
his clairvoyance ability but finds no reason at all to support his belief; 
in fact, he has misleading evidence pointing to his belief’s falsity. 
However, in this case, we wouldn’t say that Norman is not having the 
propositional attitude of believing; despite the fact he has evidence 
against it. What seems to be under dispute here is whether or not 
Norman should keep his belief, and not whether believing is the 
suitable propositional attitude at hand. The same thing can be said of 
a subject that remembers that p but have lost track of her original 
evidence for p. In this case, we are also not willing to say that her belief 
that p is not a proper propositional attitude.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues 
82 
Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, vol. X, n. 19, 2019, p. 76-82 - ISSN 1981-4194 
In order to solve the closure-based sceptical paradox Pritchard 
have appealed to Wittgenstein’s conception of the structure of 
rational evaluation, which makes use of his notion of hinge 
commitments to show that rational evaluation is essentially local.  
Pritchard argued for a no-belief reading of hinge commitments in order 
to show that the closure principle is simply not applicable to hinge 
commitments and, therefore, cannot be used to motivate the sceptical 
challenge at hand. 
The main worry I have with Pritchard’s approach is that once he 
assumes a non-belief reading of the hinge commitments he is 
accepting the propositional character of them; consequently, it 
becomes very counter-intuitive to argue that such hinge commitments 
cannot be the objects of beliefs. It became very suspicious that despite 
being propositional in character, hinge commitments can only be the 
objects of a distinct kind of propositional attitude. Pritchard fails to 
offer a compelling explanation in order to support this idea.  
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